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The Case of Jeb Stuart at Gettysburg
The story of General James Ewell Brown Stuart is among the
most-chronicled in the Civil War story. Considered by legions to be the
archetype of Virginia and southern manhood, Jeb Stuart perhaps as much as any
Confederate military figure came to represent both the Lost Cause and the cause
lost within decades after his battlefield death at Yellow Tavern, Virginia, in May
1864. As Warren C. Robinson notes within the preface of Jeb Stuart and the
Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg, the famed cavalry chieftain has stirred small
and large doses of controversy both during his career and in the decades that
followed. Nowhere, certainly, has the microscope focused more absorbedly upon
the Virginian's deeds than during the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign. Stuart's
wayward ride around the Federal Army of the Potomac is labeled by many as the
essential factor explaining Rebel defeat at Gettysburg, while others stridently
defend the famed cavalier against the barbs of his critics, pointing instead to
vagaries in orders from the Army of Northern Virginia's redoubtable
commander, General Robert E. Lee, as setting the stage for mission failure and
(ultimately) Confederate misfortune in the campaign. The author seeks to answer
affirmatively his own question: Can anything new really be added to this
century-old debate? In so doing, Robinson promises ambitiously to clarify
historical mysteries, settle historiographical feuds, and even presents an alternate
history of the campaign, a look into what might have been if Stuart had followed
a less-ambitious course in carrying out his task.
Robinson, professor emeritus of economics at the Pennsylvania State
University and author of numerous recent studies concerning higher education
policy and demographics, is an enthusiastic devotee of Civil War historyùas even
a cursory read of this book would suggestùand is generally competent in the
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narrative aspects of Stuart's Gettysburg story. After setting the strategic and
operational setting during the first half of 1863 in the East, Robinson details the
Army of Northern Virginia's northward movements into the Shenandoah and
Loudoun valleys. A look at competing visions over the proper role of the cavalry
arm during the Civil War precedes detailed discussions of Lee's orders to Stuart
before the latter embarked upon his ride on June 25. Robinson then discusses
Stuart's options in conducting his raid, followed by separate-chapter treatments
of the Virginian's foray into Maryland and Pennsylvania and, penultimately, the
clash at the Gettysburg crossroads itself.
The nagging feeling among military, Civil War, or even Gettysburg
historians when presented with a volume such as this is that an author, however
earnest, may find it difficult to offer any perspective that is new (and, more
importantly perhaps, enduring) to such a well-worn subject. In promising a fresh
approach utilizing new evidence and interpretations (x), Robinson heightens
expectations among scholarsùan uncommonly cynical group indeed. These
expectations, regrettably, remain unfulfilled. His purpose in writing this volume,
it becomes apparent after reading its preface, is to flatly condemn Stuart for his
failure during the Pennsylvania campaign to carry out the primary duty of a
cavalry chief in the middle nineteenth century: to provide the essential
intelligence necessary for an army commander to identify and evaluate enemy
movements and predilections. Of this there exists some debate among Civil War
scholars, to be sure, but Robinson himself then raises the stakes almost absurdly
high. In being absent from Lee and in failing to provide that essential
intelligence, Stuart, the author assures the reader, failed his commander and his
cause in what was the pivotal battle of the war, a contest that, if won by Lee,
may likely have resulted in a long-term occupation of Pennsylvania and, more
importantly, a negotiated peace between the warring sections. That this point
might create unease within the scholarly community is almost so self-evident to
seem superfluous.
Much of what follows resembles a lawyer's brief rather than historical
investigation and analysis. Robinson painstakingly deconstructs Lee's intentions,
Stuart's concerns, the commander's orders and communications to Stuart on June
22-23, not to mention the input (both during the campaign and afterward) of such
luminaries as James Longstreet and John Singleton Mosby. In his presentation of
these and other events, the author repeatedly tenders speculation with an air of
almost smug certainty, offering little in the realm of concrete support to bolster
his claims. Indeed, his new evidence consists largely of nods to the
2
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol10/iss2/16
already-published secondary works of Stephen W. Sears and Edwin Fishel. Most
regrettably, Robinson's examination of the existing literature on Stuart's ride
proves inadequate, undertaken seemingly to identify and refute errors in the
writings of Civil War historians/authors Edward Longacre, Mark Nesbitt, and
othersùmany of which defend Stuart and his behavior throughout the
campaignùrather than offer contextual understanding of historiographical trends.
Dismissing others' evaluations of events that counter his own as legalistic,
grammarian, and emotional, Robinson fails to rise above the controversy and
provide intellectual clarity that is at once insightful and civil.
Capping this disappointing effort is a venture into what has become a
recurring, if not prevailing, trend within Gettysburg and Civil War
historiography: the counterfactual campaign study. Speculation vis-α-vis
alternate outcomes is perhaps as old as historical inquiry itself; indeed, implicit
in criticism of commanders and their campaign decisions are claims that another
course taken, another choice made, may have led to a different (and presumably
happier) outcome. But here Robinson dives headlong into an elaborate scenario,
complete with a detailed sequence of events as they would have unfolded had
Stuart followed the correct routeùscreening Lee's army along the slope of the
Blue Ridge as it marched northùthat well-nigh assured not only decisive
Confederate victory in south-central Pennsylvania, but also the collapse of Union
political will and the cessation of hostilities. That the Federals possessed
something of a voice in military matters of such import seems not to matter
much, not when confronted with a Confederate host united in body and
(presumably) in mind. All this could have happened had Lee and his army been
given the intelligence they needed to fight the battle they were capable of
fighting, writes Robinson (166). Of course all this could have happened. That it
did not had a great deal to do with James Ewell Brown Stuart and his failure to
provide R. E. Lee with timely and necessary information as the Pennsylvania
campaign unfolded. That it did not too rested upon a myriad of additional
factorsùmilitary, social, and politicalùnot the least of which was the 92,000
officers and men of the Army of the Potomac.
Christopher S. Stowe serves as Associate Professor of History at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Lee, Virginia. The author of
numerous reviews and articles in Civil War and military history, Stowe currently
is completing a two-volume biography of George Gordon Meade to be published
by the Kent State University Press.
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